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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE A. CHASE, JR., Appellant, ~ 
vs. 
NICHOLAS G. MORGAN, SR., 
CHARITABLE FOUNDATION, ) 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
8981 
On Appeal from the District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in Appellant's Brief 
is so incomplete that the Court will be unable to make an 
application of law to the facts disclosed by this record. We 
have, therefore, deemed it necessary to direct the attention of 
this Court to a number of facts which we deem of controlling 
importance. 
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The Appellant here, plaintiff below, in support of his 
action, produced testimony which in substance is as f~llows: 
William A. Brown testified that in the months of March 
' April and May, 1957, he contacted Mr. Nicholas G. Morgan, 
Sr., and Virgil Peterson to find out if they had any oil or gas 
leases for sale (Tr. 20). That he met them in their office in 
theW alker Bank Building, and they gave the witness some plats 
of some acreage; that they set a price on the acreage and said 
they would pay a compensation if a buyer were secured. Counsel 
for defendant objected to this line of testimony as being in-
competent, in that, it was an attempt to show an oral agreement 
contrary to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
25-5-4, subdivision 5 thereof (Tr. 21). The objection was 
overruled. Objection was also made to such testimony because 
of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 6-2-1, which 
requires a Real Estate Broker to have a license. Such objection 
was also overruled (Tr. 22). 
Mr. Brown further testified that Mr. Peterson gave the 
witness a plat of the leases that were for sale. The plat was 
offered and received in evidence as Exhibit 2 (Tr. 23-4). That 
there were 13,826.54 acres shown on the plat. That at the 
time the witness was in the office of Morgan and Peterson he 
told them he was representing Mr. Baird and Mr. Chase; that 
the witness, together with Mr. Baird and Mr. Chase, had an 
office in the Judge Building, and that they were trying to get 
some leases and find buyers for such leases (Tr. 24). That 
Mr. Chase and Mr. Baird were to get the buyers; that was their 
department, and the witness was to find the leases; that witness 
is no longer connected with Baird and Chase; that in September 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
witness had a further contact with Mr. Peterson (Tr. 25). 
That he talked to Mr. Peterson and asked if the deal on the 
Thompson acre deal had gone through, and if Chase and Baird 
had received any money, and that Peterson and Morgan would 
be out of the deal about the 11th or 16th of October, and 
Baird and Chase would then start receiving their money ( T r. 
26). 
Mr. Brown also testified that he did not have a real estate 
license at the time concerning which he testified (Tr. 29). 
Mr. Chase, the Appellant here, plaintiff in the court 
below, in substance testified as follows: 
That Mr. Virgil Peterson (Mr. Morgan's associate) came 
to the office of Chase in April, 1957, about a matter of acreage 
of oil and gas leases (R. 49). That Mr. Peterson asked how 
witness was getting along in securing a buyer for the acreage 
that Mr. Brown had secured a plat for; that witness explained 
to Mr. Peterson: 
"That we were contacting various people whom we 
knew that was in the market for acreage in this area-
and at that time we had been in touch with Mr. Mac-
Donald, the Sierra Madre Oil Company." 
That sometime later in the same month witness went to see 
Mr. Morgan and Mr. Peterson at their office in the Walker 
Bank Building (Tr. 50). That Peterson and Morgan were 
there, and witness explained to them that he had a client 
or a buyer, a tentative buyer, for their acreage. That witness 
told Mr. Morgan and Mr. Peterson: 
"That the term-that the buyer wished to purchase 
this property, their lease with, or on at least, was a 
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dollar a month, a dollar down and a dollar down for 
seven months, granting the override that they had re-
quested and request what drilling commitments on 
the property." (Tr. 51. 
That in the first pai:t of May, 1957, they (Morgan and 
Peterson) told witness: 
"that they would accept four dollars an acre on the 
first four payments that were made by the buyers and 
that they would give us the next three payments, a 
total of seven payments for our services in finding 
the buyer." 
That several people were contacted, among them, Dr. Mc-
Donald, (Tr. 52); that in the middle of May, 1957, witness 
arranged for an appointment with either Mr. Morgan or Mr. 
Peterson to meet Dr. McDonald and Arch McDonald (Tr. 
55) . That the meeting arranged for was held, and that soon 
thereafter a contract for the sale and purchase of the leases 
was drawn up. That witness was not present when the contract 
was drawn up (Tr. 57). 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
plaintiff was asked this question: 
"You have alleged that you and Merton E. Baird 
rendered service to the Nicholas G. Morgan Charitable 
Foundation during the months of March, April, May 
and June of the year 1957. Will you detail just what 
services you and Mr. Merton E. Baird rendered the 
above defendant during the months of March, April, 
May and June of the year 1957, and specifically state 
any and all persons contacted by you at the special 
instance and request of defendant." 
To the foregoing interrogatory plaintiff, under oath, 
answered: 
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"Mr. Donald McDonald, president of Sierra Madre 
Oil Company, employed us to find oil and gas acreage 
suitable for development. In the course of finding 
such acreage, we contacted the defendant corporation, 
Nicholas G. Morgan Sr., and Mr. Virgil Peterson, 
who, acting on behalf of the defendant corporation, 
advised us of acreage block which they agreed to sell 
for the sum of $4.00 per acre, and agreed to pay us 
a commission of whatever we could sell said acreage 
for, in excess of said $4.00 per acre. Subsequent 
negotiations culminated in a sale for the sum of $7.00 
per acre, payable in seven installments of $13,826.45 
per installment, with the further agreement that the 
first four payments would be received by defendant 
corporation for land payment and that the last three 
installments would be paid the plaintiff and his assignee 
as his commission. Other persons contacted were Arch 
MacDonald, Jack Darrough and Marcellus Palmer." 
(R. 9 and 10). 
The following are among the claims made by the parties 
as stated in the Pretrial Order: 
"It is the contention of plaintiff that he is entitled 
to recover $41,479.62 representing the last three month-
ly payments on the land sold pursuant to an oral agree-
ment which he had with the defendant and which is 
evidenced by the letter under date of August 8, 1957, 
from the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff will 
further contend that it had no agreement with the 
defendant for the payment by the defendant to plaintiff 
and his assignor, that he had an agreement with the 
Sierra Madre Oil Company for a broker's fee of the 
amount claimed and that the defendant knew of the 
agreement and held any money paid by the Sierra 
Madre Oil Company to the defendant for the account 
of the plaintiff and his assignor." 
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In the Pretrial Order it is further stated: 
"The defendant denies that it held any money in trust 
for and on behalf of the plaintiff (R. 30) . 
"It is the contention of the defendant that there was 
no agreement to pay either George A. Chase, Jr., or 
Merton E. Baird any sum of money whatsoever, that 
they had no agreement for the plaintiff or Merton E. 
Baird to do any work for the defendant, and the de-
fendant further contends that even if there was an 
agreement, it would be void by reason of the statute 
of frauds. 
·'The defendant will further contend that any con-
tract of services rendered by the plaintiff as a broker 
would be void for the reason that neither the plaintiff 
nor his assignor had a license to do business as a broker 
or as a broker's salesman in the State of Utah. De-
fendant will further contend that it makes no claim 
to the last three monthly payments but that under its 
agreement at the time of the contract of sale of the 
oil and gas leases it had agreed with the purchaser 
that the last three payments would be paid to Donald 
McDonald, and two of said payments were made to 
the said Donald McDonald before this suit was in-
stituted, and the last of the payments is now held in 
escrow by Security Title Company, the escrow agent 
between the purchaser and the seller of the gas lease" 
(R. 30-31). 
That prior to the trial of this cause defendant made a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Among the grounds upon which the Motion for Summary 
Judgment was made are the following: 
1. That the Complaint, when viewed in the light of the 
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Answers to the interrogatories, fails to state suffi-
cient facts upon which relief may be granted. 
* * * 
3. That the Complaint, when viewed in the light of 
the answer to interrogatory number 10, said em-
ployment, if any, was performed by reason of an 
oral agreement. 
4. That if any agreement was entered into, as alleged, 
then such agreement is null and void by reason of the 
provisions of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
section 25-5-4, which provides: "In the following 
cases, every agreement shall be void unless such 
agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is 
in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith.'' 
5. "Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compen-
sation" (R. 24). 
A Motion of similar import was made at the conclusion 
of plaintiff's testimony ( T r. 96) . 
The following are among the Findings of Fact made by 
the Court below in this case: 
5. That neither George A. Chase, Jr., nor Merton B. 
Baird at any time material herein had a license to 
do business as a real estate broker in Utah, or to act 
as a salesman for a licensed broker in Utah. 
6. That the money paid to the Escrow Agent was paid 
for and on behalf of the Sierra Madre Oil Company. 
7. That defendant has been paid in full the first four 
payments as by the above mentioned agreement pro-
vided, and defendant does not claim any right, title 
or interest in the other three installment payments. 
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8. That two of the installment payments of $13,826.54 
each have been paid by the Escrow Holder to the 
Sierra Madre Oil Company, and the last installment 
payment of $13,826.54 is being held in escrow by 
the Security Title Company. 
9. That the Sierra Madre Oil Company claims the other 
$13,826.54 installment so held by the Escrow Holder. 
10. That on or about the 24th day of May, 1957, de. 
fendant orally agreed with plaintiff and Merton E. 
Baird that they should have the last three installment 
payments of $13,826.54 each for services to be ren-
dered in selling the Leases held by defendant with 
the United States Government above mentioned, and 
that said plaintiff and Merton E. Baird did render 
services in the sale of said Leases. By the Pretrial 
Order made on April 9, 1958, it is made to appear 
that plaintiff claims the right to a judgment against 
defendant for the sum of $41,479.62, and defendant 
claims that plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment 
for that, or any other amount, because, among other 
reasons, the alleged contract is null and void because 
such a contract is null and void by reason of the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 
25-5-4, and because neither plaintiff nor his assignor 
Merton E. Baird at any time material had a license 
to do business as a real estate broker in Utah, or 
to act as a salesman for a licensed broker in Utah 
as provided in Chapter 2 of Title 61, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 (R. 44-46). 
As Conclusions of Law the Court below concluded: 
1. That the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
25-5-4, are not available as a defense to the action 
of plaintiff for the reason that by the letter dated 
August 8, 1957, defendant ratified and became bound 
by the oral agreement theretofore entered into. 
10 
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2. That plaintiff is not entitled to recover any judgment 
against defendant because neither he nor his assignor 
at the time complained of had a license to do business 
as a real estate broker in Utah, or to act as a sales-
man for a licensed broker, as required by Chapter 
2, Title 61, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (R. 47). 
Appellant in his appeal does not attack any of the Findings 
of Fact, but confines his attack to the above mentioned Con-
clusions of Law No. 2. 
Defendant offered, and there was received, testimony on its 
behalf which is in direct conflict with the foregoing testimony 
offered and received in behalf of plaintiff. 
However, it is r,espondent's contention that evidence 
received in support of plaintiffs claim, even if believed in its 
entirety, the same fails to show that he is entitled to the relief 
prayed for or to any relief. 
It should be noted that the leases which form the subject 
matter of this controversy contain this provision: 
"The lessee is granted the exclusive right and privi-
lege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of 
all the oil and gas deposits, except helium gas in the 
land leased, together with the right to construct and 
maintain thereupon all works, buildings, plants, water-
ways, roads, telegraph or telephone lines, pipelines, 
reservoirs, tanks, pumping stations, on other structures 
necessary to the full enjoyment thereof, for a period 
of 5 years, and so long thereafter as oil or gas is pro-
duced in paying quantities." 
11 
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ARGUMENT 
ANSWER TO POINT I. 
A. THE FOREGOING EVIDENCE AND RECORD 
SHO\WS THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS A REAL ESTATF 
BROKER AND NOT A MIDDLEMAN IN PERFORMINI j 
THE ACTS WHICH HE CLAIMS TO HAVE PERFOIL\1ED 
IJ\I CONNECTION WITH THE SALE OF THE LEASES 
INVOLVED IN THIS CONTROVERSY. 
The testimony, the Answers to the Interrogatories sub-
mitted to plaintiff, the Pretrial Order and the Findings of Fact 
show that plaintiff and his assignor's claim for compensation 
for services rendered in the sale of the leases owned by plaintiff 
were those of a Real Estate Broker, and in no sense those of 
a middlman. The functions of a real estate broker are to secure 
a purchaser who is ready, able and willing to purchase the 
property which the broker is authorized to sell. Cuftis v. Mor-
tensen, 1 Utah (2d) 354, 267, Pac. (2d) 237; Hoyt v. Wasatch 
I-lomes, Inc., 1 Utah (2d) 9, 161 Pac. (2d) 927. It is when, 
and only when, he has accomplished that result pursuant to 
a written contract as provided by U.C.A. 1953, 25-5-4, sub-
division 5 thereof, that he is entitled to a commission. It is there 
provided that: 
"Every agreement authorizing or empowering an 
agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation must be in writing." 
Appellant in his Brief has cited a number of cases, which, 
it is claimed, show that plaintiff was a mere middleman. 
Coun~;el has not in his Brief seen fit to direct attention to the 
fads which form the basis for the claims that appellant was 
12 
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a mere middleman. We shall, therefore, content ourselves 
with the statement that none of the cases there cited support 
or tend to support the claim that appellant and his associates 
were mere middlemen. Quite the contrary. The only case cited 
by Appellants which sheds light on the question as a middleman 
is that of Vander Sluys v. Finfrock, 103 S. 730. (La. 1925). 
Other cases and authorities dealing with the question 
where one who performs services in connection with the sale of 
property belonging to another is a broker is discussed in 8 
Am. fur., Sec. 14, page 997, et seq. It is there said: 
"The essential and basic feature underlying the re-
lation of a broker to his employer is that of agency, and 
the principles of law applicable to principal and agent 
govern their respective rights and liabilities through-
out. The mere fact that by the terms of his employment 
a broker is to receive as compensation for his services 
all that he can secure above a fixed price placed upon 
the property to be sold does not render his undertaking 
a joint venture with his principal or otherwise change 
the character of his relation to the latter. 
"A contract by a landowner giving another an option 
on land at a stipulated price, under which the land-
owner agrees to show the land to any customer secured 
by such other person and to pay him as a commission 
whenever he furnishes a customer far over the stipu-
lated price is a contract to pay a commission, not an 
option to buy." 
Of similar import is the text in 12 C.J.S., page 6, under the 
heading: "Real Estate Broker or Agent." Numerous cases are 
cited in footnotes to the text. 
An examination of such cases shows that Appellant was 
at the time here involved a real estate broker. No useful 
13 
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purpose will be served by analyzing the numerous cases there 
cited. We direct the attention of the Court to the case of 
Goody v. Maryland Casualty Co., 25 Pac. (2d) 1045, 53 Idaho 
523, as showing the trend of judicial authority. The act there 
construed is similar to the provisions of U.C.A. 61-2-1 and 
61-2-2. The Idaho statute also has a provision similar to U.C.A. 
1953, whereby one act of buying or selling for compensation 
shall constitute one so buying or selling a real estate broker. 
B. THE UTAH STATUTES APPLY TO TRANSAC-
TIONS HAD IN OIL AND GAS LEASES. 
It will be noted from the Utah Statute which is quoted 
on page 7 of Appellant's Brief that almost all conceivable 
transactions that have to do with real estate are expressly 
included within the definition of a real estate broker. It includes 
transactions when a fee or commission is to be paid for 
services rendered in the sale, exchange, purchase, rent, lease 
or listing, or offer or attempt or agreement to list, or auctions, 
or offers or attempts or agrees to collect rentals for the use 
of real estate or who advertises or holds himself . . . out as 
engaged in the business of selling, exchanging, purchasing, 
renting or leasing real estate or assists or directs in the pro-
curing of prospects or the negotiating or closing of any trans-
action which does or is calculated to result in the sale, exchange, 
leasing or renting of any real estate. 
Appellant cites in his Brief at page 9 thereof and quotes 
from the provisions of 12 C.J.S. 14, wherein it is provided 
that the statute was enacted to protect the public in the handling 
by agents of important and valuable transactions relating to 
14 
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real property. We can conceive of no reason why people who 
are the owners of gas and oil leases are not in need of and 
entitled to protection the same as other people who are the 
owners of other kinds of real estate. If there should be any 
doubt of such need, the evidence in this case should dispel any 
such doubt. Here plaintiff is seeking to recover $41,479.62 
founded upon a claim of an oral agreement to which he, at 
most, rendered service of a value of a few dollars. 
Appellant cites in support of his claim the case of Anderson 
t/. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 Pac. (2d) 725. The facts in 
that case are not comparable to the facts in this case. In the 
Anderson v. Johnson case, supra, the agreement was between 
a broker and his employee. The broker was not the owner of 
the property there involved. Johnson merely agreed to pay 
Anderson for securing the listing of property for sale. In this 
case it is claimed by Appellant that he should recover com-
pensation from Respondent, who was the owner of the leases. 
It is readily understandable that the statute was not intended 
to protect a real estate broker touching a contract for services 
rendered by his employee. In this case Appellant is not seeking 
to recover for services rendered to a broker who does not own 
the property involved, but he seeks to recovr from the owner 
of the property. It is apparent that the act is intended to protect 
the property owner and not brokers. 
C. THE INTERESTS OF RESPONDENT IN THE OIL 
AND GAS LEASES HERE INVOLVED ARE REAL ESTATE, 
AND EVEN IF THE SAME ARE NOT REAL ESTATE, 
ONE DEALING IN SUCH LEASES IS WITHIN THE PRO-
VISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953, 61-2-1 AND 61-2-2. 
i) 
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In the case of Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal. (2d) 1, 53 Pac. 
(2d) 962, there is a lengthy discussion of when an oil and 
gas lease is real estate. Numerous cases are there cited and 
analyzed from the State of California and elsewhere. It is there 
held that a lease which provides for a definite term of years 
is not included in the term real estate, but that when a lease 
contains the further provision that the lease is to continue so 
long thereafter as oil and gas, or either of said substances is 
produced therefrom, in quantities sufficient to pay to pump 
or otherwise secure and save them, in such case the lease is 
real property. See: Pac. Rep. page 966. Such, it is said, is the 
common law. Some of the other cases cited by Appellant are 
to the same effect. None of such cases hold to the contrary. 
It will be noted that the leases here involved were to continue 
so long as gas or oil was being secured in paying quantities. 
We shall not discuss such other cases because one dealing 
in leases is a real estate broker, if and when he sells a lease 
for the owner thereof without regard to whether or not such 
lease is real property as that term is defined at common law. 
As a further ground for sustaining the judgment of the 
lower Court Respondent contends that: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF BELOW, APPELLANT HERE, IS NOT 
BARRED FROM RECOVERY BECAUSE OF THE PROVI-
SIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, 25-5-1 AND 
25-5-4, SUBDIVISION 5. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, 25-5-1, in substance provides 
that no estate or interest in real estate other than leases for 
16 
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a term not exceeding one year shall be granted except by an 
instrument in writing subscribed by the party granting the same, 
or his agent, authorized in writing. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, 25-5-4, subdivision 5, provides 
that every agreement authorizing or empowering an agent or 
broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation must 
be in writing. It is a well settled principle of statutory con-
struction that words dealing with the same subject matter 
must be given the same meaning. 50 Am. fur. sec. 349, page 345, 
et seq., and cases cited in footnotes. 
Applying this principle in this case, the use of the term 
"real estate' as used in the various statutory provisions cited 
in Appellant's Brief and in this Brief should be construed to 
mean the same kind of property. The leases here involved 
contained a provision that the same should extend "for a period 
of five years and ·so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in 
paying quantities." (See copy of Lease). 
This Court is committed to the doctrine that before recov-
ery may be had for services rendered in the sale of real prop-
erty, such services must be rendered pursuant to a written 
agreement. Chase v. Rolph, 56 Utah 243, 188 Pac. 640; Smith 
Realty Co. v. Diepietro, 77 Utah 176, 292 Pac. 915; Miffin 
v. Shikki, 77 Utah 190, 293 Pac.; Bernard v. Hardy, 77 Utah 
218, 293 Pac. 12. Other cases from other states will be found 
cited in the foregoing Utah cases. 
During the course of the trial of the case below the case 
of Ney v. Harrison, 299 Pac. (2d) 1114, 5 Utah (2d) 217, 
was cited as having overruled the other Utah cases above cited. 
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As we read that case it does not overrule the doctrine that there 
must be a written memorandum pursuant to which the service 
is rendered. The case of N ey v. Harrison, supra, does not, as we 
read it, cast any doubt upon the law to the effect that to recover 
a broker's fee for services rendered, that such services must be 
performed pursuant to a written contract. It is made to appear 
in the case of Ney v. Harrison, supra, that the plaintiff in that 
case had a written agreement signed by the owner of the prop-
erty there involved at the time he rendered the service. 
It is submitted that the judgment int his case should be 
affirmed with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLARD R. HUNTSMAN and 
ELIAS HANSEN 
721-726 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
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